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 A car electronic security system aims to prevent its theft, the theft of its parts 
or of elements in its interior. Studying these systems allows identifying and 
mitigating vulnerabilities. Nowadays, there are different types of attacks on 
these systems to exploit their vulnerabilities, such as replay, relay, brute-force 
or jamming attacks, among others. In the last five years in Bogotá, Colombia, 
the average number of stolen vehicles was 3,073 per year. This research project 
proposes the detection of vulnerabilities in the security system of vehicles in 
this city. A sample of 43 vehicles of different brands sold and registered in the 
city is taken. The replay attack was executed, as well as a modification of the 
brute-force attack. Results show that most of the implemented security systems 
in Bogotá are susceptible of being successfully attacked through the proposed 
methods. The analysis done on the brute-force attack highlights a considerable 
reduction in time for unlocking the vehicle compared to the conventional 
attack in more vulnerable RKE systems. Replay attacks turn successful in great 
part of the sample and, furthermore, it is concluded that the unlocking key code 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Implementation of security systems in motor vehicles has always been present, whether it is through 
mechanical systems or complex electronic systems. Manufacturers develop security mechanisms to avoid car 
theft, the theft of its parts or of elements in its interior. In Bogotá, Colombia, motor car theft daily affects 
owners according to data delivered by the National Police. Most thefts occur when users park their vehicles on 
the street, on parking bays, in front of their homes, or in public car parks. In the last five years in Bogotá, the 
average number of stolen vehicles was 3,073 per year [1]. The most affected city localities were Kennedy and 
Puente Aranda, specifically in the neighbourhoods of Kennedy Central, Galán, Patio Bonito, Castilla, and 
Tintal. The highest theft frequency is between July and September, and the preferred colour by delinquents is 
white. The most appealing motor vehicles for theft are luxury vehicles, followed by SUVs, 4WD vehicles, and 
trucks [2]. There are different motor vehicle theft methods and delinquents are always looking for new 
techniques, so as not to be detected. In this sense, vulnerabilities in the electronic security systems of vehicles 
of different brands are currently made evident. These vulnerabilities are exposed in different scientific articles 
and lately, on blogs and videos. The most popular types of attack to exploit these vulnerabilities are replay, 
relay and brute-force attacks. Replay attacks consist in storing the radiofrequency (RF) signal sent by the 
system key to do the ulterior retransmission, and thus, have access to the vehicle [3]. Relay attacks generally 
involve two people working together. One is next to the vehicle, while the other is near the key. The interchange 
of messages between the real key and the vehicle is given by the two individuals carrying out the attack, since 
they set a channel of communication that is strange to the system. The control unit does not identify that the 
real key is in a remote place [4]. There is another type of attack called brute-force that generates all possible 
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keys for the security systems until there is a match and unlocks the vehicle [5]. From a technical point of view, 
the security mechanisms for vehicles imply the direct use of alarms, which are considered security systems 
capable of alerting some abnormal state that may be present in the vehicle, whether it is forcing of handles or 
bumps on the surface. Traditionally, accessing and starting a motor vehicle is done through a physical key to 
unlock the door and the starting systems; however, the door and alarm unlock systems by RF have become 
popular and have evolved with different brands and models of vehicles. Among these systems, to highlight 
some, there are PKES (Passive Keys Entry and Start) and RKE (Remote Keyless Entry) systems. The RKE 
systems are designed for the owner to press a button to lock and unlock the vehicle and the PKES ones normally 
do not require any action by the user for unlocking [6]. The purpose for each system is to constantly be 
improved and to evaluate its proper functioning to identify flaws that allow refinement; vehicle security 
systems are no exception. From the point of view of informatics security, specifically the ethical hacking 
branch, it is defined that attacks can be used as a tool to identify these vulnerabilities and to work in favour of 
mitigating or eliminating them. The exploitation of vulnerabilities present in the security systems requires 
intrusion tests that help to verify and evaluate the physical and logical security of the information systems [7]. 
In the present work, the research is focused on developing attacks and identifying flaws to mitigate them, which 
is commonly called white hat hacking [8]. This project shows the reality of electronic security systems for the 
most used vehicles in Bogotá, and experimentally exposes different vulnerabilities in a study that involves 
types of systems, brands, and models. 
The use of SDR (software-defined radio) devices has become popular lately, and it is an accessible 
technology nowadays. Its main feature is the possibility to reconfigure the implementation of RF systems. This 
article exposes vehicle security system vulnerabilities at a specific location by using SDR technology in two 
types of attacks. These vulnerabilities can be more highly exploited due to the easy acquisition of SDR 
platforms and the lack of sophisticated security systems in common vehicles. This situation can be common in 
different countries with similar socioeconomic features from this region, given the fact that brands and 
providers are the same. This article also presents a reverse engineering analysis that allows reducing times in 
a brute-force attack for RKE systems with fixed code technology. 
There are many proposed research projects that evaluate the possible attacks to which security systems 
of vehicles are exposed; hereunder, the most relevant projects that contribute to the structure of the current one 
will be highlighted. In [9], a study was done on the attacks to the PKES system in high-end vehicles. The attack 
was intended to access, start, and drive the vehicle away, by means of the retransmission of RF messages 
between the car and the key. Tests were made in 10 vehicles of 8 different manufactures concluding that the 
attack was 90% successful and the remaining 10% could not be executed due to robustness of the security 
systems. In [10], an analysis of vulnerabilities in the car keys is proposed based on the Hitag2 mechanism. The 
objective is to program a key fob and to carry out the extraction of the code, so that later, by means of a 
transponder, the code of the key can be imitated, and thus, be used to open the vehicle. This analysis was done 
in 8 vehicles, and it determined the possibility of recovering the secret key code sent by the alarm control unit 
of the vehicle once it is locked or unlocked. 
In [11], a strategy attack is carried out, which is called jam-listen-and-replay or replay attack. This 
attack requires the transmission of interference and a recorder of signals; the attack is evaluated with six models 
of vehicles, thus exposing the vulnerabilities presented by these systems, and it is concluded that the solution 
for keyless remote systems cannot be dimmed safe. In [12], PKES systems are analysed in high-end vehicles 
and it is revealed that systems are based on a 40-bit encryption for starting and unlocking. It is concluded that 
these systems are vulnerable to relay attacks, in addition to not performing mutual authentication to unlock the 
vehicle. In [13], a Hitag2 attack is presented which allows recovering the encrypted key of a vehicle, and thus, 
the cloning of its remote control. This attack was tested in 17 cars from 8 manufactures and it was successful 
in 100% of the cases. In [14] and evaluation of 2 attacks is done: Jam-listen-and-replay on the RKE and PKES 
systems; an Android app was developed to detect the presence of a strong constant signal to a determined 
frequency. It is concluded that it is easy to detect signals from an alarm control unit through low-cost SDR 
devices. In [15], the recording of a signal and then its transmission to unlock a vehicle are proposed, without 
having access to the real code; the tests were done with 6 brands of cars that work at different frequencies. It 
is concluded that the signals sent by the control unit of the vehicle are within reach of anyone when carrying 
out a replay attack and that it is possible to capture and transmit them again. In [16], attacks with Hitag2 are 
studied to identify weaknesses of an alarm encryption, by executing three practical attacks that recover the 
secret key code using wireless communication. This attack was made with more than 20 vehicles from multiple 
brands and models, finding thus, several weaknesses within the systems. 
Different research projects revealed some of the technologies and hardware used for making the 
attacks. In [17], a transceiver system based on RTL is studied, a hardware that includes an RF mixer and a 
USRP. A cost evaluation is done between these devices to carry out a reception and transmission of radio 
signals. It is concluded that the proposed method that uses the RF and RTL-SDR mixer is the best for the 
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transmission and reception of signals due to its low cost in comparison to the USRP. In [18], the evaluation of 
the low-cost RTL-SDR dongle is done through GNU-Radio and SDR. Coding of digital signal processing 
(DSP) algorithms is studied to process radio signals coming from any type of device over the frequency range 
of 57 kHz to 92.9 Mhz. The facility to listen to, capture and transmit radio signals with any SDR device is 
determined. 
On the other hand, from the studies oriented towards detecting and mitigating attacks in motor vehicles 
the following can be underlined: In [19], a vehicle security system is presented through GSM/GPRS networks 
for the control and monitoring of the vehicle. The system, by means of a call to the vehicle phone number, can 
control it and activate or deactivate the alarm, open and close the locks, start and stop the vehicle, turn on and 
off the air-conditioning, open the hood and the trunk, and also, request information of the vehicle physical 
variables such as temperature, gas and oil levels. The car status information is sent via text messages to the 
user’s mobile phone. In [20] an analysis of vulnerabilities is done via wireless technology applied in vehicles 
in Guayaquil, Ecuador. Through simulation, the vehicle central computer is emulated to develop hacking tests 
using CAN-BUS networks. It is concluded that it is possible to hack the central computer by means of these 
networks, and a proposal is made to solve the detected vulnerabilities through a Link Management Protocol 
(LMP) algorithm. In [21], a detection method of a relay attack in vehicles is proposed by means of the intensity 
of an RF signal. The method allows, through the intensity of the signal, to deduce if the receiving signal belongs 
to the car control unit or if it is the retransmission of one of the attackers’ device. 
Once the theoretical exploration is performed, vulnerabilities were detected in most of the vehicle 
security systems, which can be exploited through attacks such as replay, relay, signal jamming, and brute-force 
ones. This research project proposes the detection of vulnerabilities in the security systems of 43 vehicles of 
different brands, sold and registered in the city of Bogotá between 2000 and 2019. The replay attack is 
proposed, as well as a modification to the brute-force one. This modification is presented from the analysis of 
known security system encryption in vehicles from different manufacturers. The implemented brute-force 
attack allows a reduction of substantial time in the unlocking of a vehicle compared to the brute-force attack 
using all possible combinations for the number of bits of a code. For the execution of the attacks, the low-cost 
software-defined radio (SDR) HackRF One platform and the GNURadio software are used. Two scenarios are 
proposed in which the SDR system is used to capture, replicate, or generate the RF signals with which the 
attacks are made in the operation frequency of the key fob. The SDR system consists of the SDR platform and 
a PC. The type of blocking system, the key code number of bits, and the carrier modulation, encryption and 
frequency were analysed, and the attacks algorithms were implemented. The geographical limitation of the 
study reveals average situations of the region that make these kinds of attacks prevail even today. 
This article is initially organised with a state of the art that confirms the importance of evaluating the 
vulnerabilities within these security systems. The second section presents a theoretical contextualization of 
security systems in vehicles, exiting attacks, SDR, among others. The third and fourth section present the 
proposed scenarios and the analysis of obtained results, respectively. Finally, conclusions on the executed 
attacks are presented. 
 
2. RESEARCH METHOD – THEORETICAL CONTEXTUALIZATION 
2.1 Theoretical contextualization on alarms 
An alarm is considered a system capable of alerting and announcing the change of an abnormal state 
presented in any setting. In a vehicle, it is an electronic security device considered as an audible system capable 
of alerting cases such as: forcing of doors, tilting or sudden movement, breakage of glass, among others. 
Accessing and starting a vehicle is done by means of a physical key and a control command system (alarm) 
which enables unlocking the door lock system and the starting of the vehicle. However, alarm and door locking 
unlocking systems through RF have become popular. Alarms in vehicles enable the detection of the signal by 
means of RF sensors and send the signal to the alarm central kernel, which analyses the signal, identifies its 
authenticity, and suspends the car security elements. Alarms have average ranges of 10 to 20 m when unlocking 
a vehicle, and they have operation frequencies of 315, 370, and 434 MHz. As time progresses, alarms have 
evolved in line with different brands and models of vehicles in the market. Two security systems can be found 
in vehicles: PKES and RKE. RKE are electronic access systems that can be controlled in the distance. PKES 
are systems that work automatically when the user is near the vehicle. They unlock the door when the user is 
coming closer or when the door handle is pulled and lock it when the user walks away or touches the vehicle 






IJEEI  ISSN: 2089-3272  
 
Vulnerability analysis in RF locking systems of vehicles.. (Juan Carlos Martínez-Quintero et al) 
117 
 
Table 1.  Characteristics of vehicle security systems 
Systems  Characteristics 
PKES 
• This system includes an RF control unit or a smart card. 
• The module within the vehicle continually sends encrypted messages. 
• If the control unit is within range, it responds.  
• If encrypted messages are correct, the vehicle and key fob identify each other, and the door opens. 
• It always uses different codes avoiding replay attacks. 
RKE 
• The user who holds the device presses a button to lock or unlock. 
• This system operates at 315 MHz for vehicles manufactured in North America. 
• It operates at 433,92 MHz for European, Japanese, and Asian vehicles. 
• It enables controlling the car starting systems, the security alarm, horn, lights, and trunk. 
  
2.1.1 Alarm systems 
Alarm systems are passive security elements capable of warning about possible issues or abnormal 
situations, thus fulfilling a deterrent function. These systems are composed of one or more sensors connected 
to an alarm horn. Most systems have door, movement, tilting and vibration sensors, and a horn and 
radiofrequency receiver to enable wireless control. The main components for a vehicle alarm system can be 




            Figure 1. Components of an alarm system in vehicles 
2.2 Types of Attacks 
An attack consists in taking advantage of a system or software vulnerability, to obtain some sort of 
benefit; for a vehicle security system, an attack is considered when a person takes advantage of a weakness or 
flaw in the software or hardware to be able to steal it or to steal belongings within it. Among attacks to the 
electronic system of a vehicle the following can be underlined [23]: 
• Replay Attack: In this type of attack, the attacker takes the content of the message, it means, the 
signal sent by the alarm control unit, and stores it to subsequently perform the retransmission of the 
information and thus, have access to the vehicle. Afterwards, the attacker can make use of the obtained 
information at any moment [3]. 
• Relay Attack:  It is done to vehicles equipped with smart keys. To execute the attack, a receiver and 
a transmitter that mutually amplify signals are needed; the transmitter must be located as close as 
possible to the vehicle, and the receiver must be located at 8 meters or less from the alarm control 
unit. The attack can be successful because the vehicle detects the signal that was replicated from the 
owner’s original key. [4] 
• Signal Jamming Attack (Master Key): This attack requires a control unit identical to that of the 
owner of the car to deactivate the alarm and have access to it; in some cases, this control unit also 
works as a starting key.  With this device the security system circuit is altered and there is no need for 
physical forcing of the vehicle [24]. 
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• Brute-Force Attack: This type of attack involves trying to decipher a password by trial and error. 
Attackers try several random combinations until the correct pattern matches. Another way to perform 
this attack is to capture the signal sent by the alarm to, subsequently, decode it and obtain its key code, 
thus, being able to transmit it and have access to the vehicle.[5] 
 
2.3 SDR (Software-Defined Radio) 
SDR is defined as: “Radio in which some or all functions of the physical layer are defined by 
software”. It is defined as a collection of hardware and software technologies where the operative functions of 
the radio are implemented by modifiable software or firmware that works with programmable processing 
technologies. These devices include FPGA, DSP, General Purpose Processor (GPP), System on a Chip (SoC), 
and specific programmable applications. The use of these technologies enables adding new capabilities and 
wireless functions to the existing radio systems without requiring new hardware. [25] The most common SDR 
platforms are USRP, RTL, and HackRF One. The latter provides the same functions as the USRP but at a low 
cost. Both USRP and HackRF can transmit or receive radio signals in the range from 1 MHz to 6 GHz. HackRF 
One is an open-source hardware platform that can be used as a USB peripheral or can be programmed for 
standalone operation. [26] 
 
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND SIGNAL ANALYSIS 
3.1 Proposed Scenarios 
Two scenarios are proposed to detect and exploit vulnerabilities in RF key fob security systems. In 
both scenarios, an SDR system is used to capture or generate the RF signals with which attacks are performed 
on the key fob frequency operation. The SDR system consists of the SDR platform and a computer. Table 2 
shows the technical characteristics of the equipment used for both scenarios. 
 
Table 2. Characteristics of equipment used for proposed scenarios 
Equipment  Characteristics 
 
SDR Hack RF one 
Platform 
• Half-duplex Transceptor. 
• Up to 20 million samples per second. 
• 8-bit quadrature samples (8-bits I and 8-bits Q). 
• Compatible with GNU Radio. 
• RX and TX gain configurable by software and baseband filter. 
• Software controlled antenna port power (50 mA to 3.3 V). 
• SMA female connector. 
• Clock input and output for synchronization. 
• High speed 2.0 USB. 
• Open source. 
Vehicle • To execute the attacks, 43 vehicles were chosen from models between 1998 to 2019. Their characteristics 
are random since they vary depending on the model of each one of them. 
Scenario 
Characteristics 
• Scenario 1: Key fob (Its characteristics are random since they vary depending on model and manufacturer) 
• Sample Frequency: 2Msps 
• Carrier Frequency: 315MHz, 370MHz, or 443MHz 
 
 
The first scenario is shown in Figure 2. In this scenario, the signal is generated by the key fob that 
normally controls access and locking of the vehicle. The SDR system works as a passive signal receiver that 
crosses the environment freely and unrestrictedly. The attack consists in retransmitting the signal captured by 
means of the SDR platform, cheating the security system into believing it is the real key fob transmission to 
accomplish its deactivation. The signal is retransmitted using the same SDR platform used for the capture (it 
is also possible to use one of similar characteristics). This attack is known as “Replay Attack”. The software 
used for capturing, storing, and retransmitting the signal is called GNURadio. The distance between devices 
(PC and HackRF One) and the vehicle depends on the space where the car is located to carry out the execution 
of the proposed scenario. 
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Figure 2. Assembly implemented for Scenario 1 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the second proposed scenario. In this scenario, there is no available key fob to generate 
the RF signal that opens the vehicle. In this case, it starts from knowing the signal that must be transmitted. It 
is necessary to know the type of locking system, the number of bits in the key code, modulation, encryption, 
and carrier frequency. The main principle is the implementation of an algorithm to generate passwords through 
a binary counter. These passwords are encoded, modulated, and transmitted with characteristics of a real signal 
using the SDR platform. This attack is known as “Brute-Force Attack” and seeks to generate all possible 
passwords for the security system until there is a match and the car is unlocked. The generation and 
transmission of signals were carried out through the GNURadio software. To know the unlocking signals of an 
RKE-type security system, the received signal from a real system key fob was analysed using Matlab. 
 
 
Figure 3. Assembly implemented for Scenario 2 
 
3.2 Attack Execution, Processing and Analysis  
3.2.1 Replay Attack 
A replay attack is executed in two parts. The first part is storage, for which the block diagram of 
Figure 4 is defined and implemented through GNURadio. This allows storing the signal sent by the RF key fob 
that travels freely through the air. The “Osmocom Source” block is used to configure the HackRF parameters. 
The “Ch0: Frequency (Hz)” parameter configures the main oscillator frequency; this frequency can vary 
depending on the security system key fob that is being analysed. The “Sample Rate (SPS)” parameter is used 
to configure the sample frequency, and, for practical effects, it is equivalent to the bandwidth of the received 
signal due to the SDR device IQ configuration. The RF and IF gain is configured to maximum values to obtain 
a good signal level at a greater distance. The “File Sink” block enables storing the received signal in a complex 
format (IQ). The signal is stored without any modification. The “QT GUI Sink” block processes the signal 
through FFT (Fast Fourier Transform) and presents the result in a graphical user interface. Figure 4 shows how 
the signal from a key that works in a frequency close to 370 MHz is stored. The spectrum delivered by this 
block diagram is shown in Figure 5. In the central spectrum frequency (369.5 MHz), an undesired peak 
generated by the SDR platform is observed. This peak is the result of the mixing process in the RF stage of the 
HackRF platform. The highest observed peak in the spectrum is the signal in frequency transmitted by the key 
fob. If the local oscillator is tuned at the same key frequency, interference is generated between the two peaks 
and it is possible that the attack fails due to decrease of the signal quality. For this reason, the local oscillator 
is configured under the transmission frequency of the key fob. 
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Figure 4. Signal Storing Program in GNURadio 
 
Figure 5. Spectrum in frequency of the key signal 
 
The second part of the attack consists in transmitting the stored signal. The block diagram in Figure 
6 shows how the stored signal transmission is done. The program consists of 2 blocks; the first block, “File 
Source”, reads the signal stored in a complex format and delivers it to the “Osmocom Sink” block. The latter is 
configured with the same parameters from Figure 4. The execution of this block diagram enables the 
transmission of the stored signal coming from the security system key fob. In this sense, the vehicle receiving 
system obtains the same signal that would be transmitted by the original key. 
 
 
Figure 6. GNURadio signal transmission program 
 
3.2.2 Brute-Force Attack 
For the execution of the brute-force attack, two tests were carried out. This attack is based on the 
analysis of the signal transmitted by the security system key fob. The signal was analysed using Matlab. Figure 
7 shows a baseband signal into the time domain. The acquisition of the signal was performed under similar 
conditions as in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 7. Signal transmitted by the baseband key 
 
In Figure 7, the letter "A" represents a 25-bit key coded and modulated in ASK (Amplitude Shift 
Keying). The 25-bit key is repeated eight times in each transmission. Letter "B" is the space (without 
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transmission) between each repetition. In total, there are 7 blank spaces (B), which are equivalent to the 
transmission time of 6 bits each. Figure 8 portrays a diagram of the complete frame composition. 
 
Figure 8. Key formation and composition 
In the lower part of Figure 8, the coding of each bit and the blank spaces are also detailed. Each of the 
25 bits is coded and modulated in ASK as shown in Figure 9. The coding of a "1" is a sequence of three high 
levels and one low level. The coding of a "0" is a sequence of one high level and three low levels. Each level 
(high or low) has a duration of 330µs, which is equivalent to 660 samples if a sampling rate of 2 Msps is used 
as in this case. A blank space "B" is equivalent to 6-bit time. Each of these spaces equivalent to one bit is coded 
with a sequence of four levels in low (L), that is 24 L for each "B". 
 
 
Figure 9. “1” – “0” sequence coded and modulated in ASK 
 
To generate the signal from SDR, it is appropriate to handle the signal in terms of the number of 
samples per level or per bit. The number of samples per bit is determined from Equation 1. 
𝑛𝑏 =  𝑛𝐿  ×   𝐿𝑏  (1) 
Where 𝑛𝑏 is the number of physical samples per bit, 𝑛𝐿 is the number of physical samples per level, 
and 𝐿𝑏 is the number of levels per bit. In this case, 𝑛𝐿 = 660 and 𝐿𝑏 = 4, therefore, 𝑛𝑏 = 2,640 samples. The 
number of samples for the entire key is given by Equation 2. 
𝑛𝑘 =  𝑛𝑏  ×  𝑁𝑏𝐴+𝐵  ×  𝑁𝑅   (2) 
Where 𝑛𝑘 is the number of samples of the key, 𝑁𝑏𝐴+𝐵 is the number of bits of the sequence "A" plus 
the equivalent bits of the blank sequence "B", and NR is the number of repetitions of sequences "A" and "B" 
together.  For this case, 𝑛𝑏 = 660 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠, 𝑁𝑏𝐴+𝐵 =  31 bits y 𝑁𝑅 = 8, therefore, 𝑛𝑘 = 654,729 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠, 






Where 𝑓𝑠 is the sampling frequency: In this case, 𝑇𝑘 = 0.32736𝑠. This last time is the same it would 
take for an SDR system to generate a key in a brute-force attack. If a 25-bit counter is used to generate 
consecutive keys, the maximum worst-case attack time can be calculated from Equation 4. 
𝑇𝑀𝐴 =  𝑇𝑘  ×  2
𝑛 (4) 
For Equation 4, 𝑇𝑀𝐴 is the maximum execution time of the attack and 𝑛 is the number of bits in the 
key. Solving the equation for the 25-bit key gives a maximum attack execution time of 10,984,378s or 127.13 
days. The total number of keys generated is  2𝑛 = 33,554,432. Figure 10 illustrates the flowchart of the 
program developed to execute the brute-force attack. 
 
                ISSN: 2089-3272 
IJEEI, Vol.9, No. 1, March 2021:  114 - 129 
122
 
Figure 10. Flowchart for key generation and transmission 
 
The program uses a 25-bit counter as a key generator; each count represents a testing "A" key. The 
counter passes through a parallel-to-serial converter to achieve the bit-by-bit transmission. Each bit is coded 
as shown in Figure 9; after the transmission of the last bit, a blank space "B" is generated. The red signal shown 
in Figure 11 was generated with a counter value started with the code of a testing vehicle and without 
subsequent counter increment. Figure 11 shows the generated signal vs. the original stored signal from the 
testing vehicle. The times meet the analysis described in this section. 
 
Figure 11. Generated signal (red) vs. actual stored key (blue) 
 
To test the brute-force attack, a counter was started 50 values behind the key value of the testing 
vehicle, and it was increased to 50 values afterwards. The counter is incremented by leaving only a "B" space 
between the end of a key and the beginning of another. When the attack is executed, the vehicle does not open; 
however, when the counter passes the correct key, the security system makes a particular sound. Subsequently, 
by performing the same experiment, the time space between each key was increased before the counter 
increment. Each test increments an additional "B" space at the end of the key, and it is maintained for the 100 
iterations. At the end, the vehicle is unlocked with 25 "B" spaces as shown in Figure 12.  The 25 repetitions of 
"B" form a "C" sequence. 
 
 
Figure 12. Initial key plus "C" spacing 
 
Equation 5 is a modification of equation 2 to determine the total number of samples in the key and 
the additional "C" space. 
𝑛𝑘 =  𝑛𝑏  × (𝑁𝑏𝐴+𝐵  ×  𝑁𝑅 + 𝑁𝑏𝐶) (5) 
In this equation 𝑁𝑏𝐶  is the equivalent number of bits in "C" space. Considering that "B" has a 6-bit 
equivalent -as defined at the beginning of this section- "C" would have an equivalent number of bits 25 times 
greater, which means 150 bits. This gives a total number of samples of 𝑛𝑘 = 1,050,720 per key. According to 
Equation 3, the duration of a key is 𝑇𝑘 =  0.52536s, and, using Equation 4, a maximum attack execution time 
IJEEI  ISSN: 2089-3272  
 
Vulnerability analysis in RF locking systems of vehicles.. (Juan Carlos Martínez-Quintero et al) 
123 
can be obtained, which is 𝑇𝑀𝐴 = 17,628,156𝑠  or 204.02 days using all possible combinations. Performing 
this attack ensures that the vehicle will be unlocked when the keys match. Nonetheless, a long-time attack as 
such is not practical. 
 
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Replay Attack 
The replay attack was executed in different vehicles like those shown in Figures 13 and 14. In these 








Figure 14. Evidence 2 of scenario 1 
 
Table 3 shows the results of the attack and some basic characteristics of the security system for 43 
different models of -randomly selected- vehicles registered in the city of Bogotá. The vehicles shaded in blue 
have a security system that uses a technique called "rolling code", with which the transmitter and receiver 
generate identical pseudo-random keys based on the same seed. When the key is afar, it may generate codes 
that the receiver cannot collect; to solve this problem, the receiver (in the vehicle) generates the next 256 keys 
and accepts any of them in that range, as long as it does not repeat. To execute the attack in this type of vehicle, 
one or more key signals are stored away from the receiver, where it has no coverage, more than 10 m in practice. 
After a successful execution of a stored key, it can no longer be used to open the vehicle again. If several keys 
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1 2015 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
2 2012 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
3 2008 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
4 2015 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
5 2013 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
6 2008 No 315.166 Successful RKES 
7 2016 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
8 2018 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
9 2010 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
10 2017 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
11 2010 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
12 2009 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
13 2012 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
14 2012 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
15 2015 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
16 2015 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
17 2008 No 316.264 Successful RKES 
18 2011 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
19 2010 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
20 2008 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
21 2016 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
22 2015 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
23 2016 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
24 2017 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
25 2016 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
26 2018 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
27 2014 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
28 2014 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
29 2012 No 315.497 Successful RKES 
30 2019 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
31 2000 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
32 2011 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
33 1998 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
34 2008 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
35 2012 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
36 2015 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
37 2011 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
38 2000 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
39 2008 No 433.427 Successful RKES 
40 2018 Yes 433.427 Not Successful PKES 
41 2019 Yes 314.166 Not Successful PKES 
42 2015 Yes 433.427 Not Successful PKES 
43 2008 Yes 433.842 Not Successful PKES 
 
Once the attack was carried out, it was determined that 39 from the 43 vehicles managed to be 
unlocked, which is equivalent to 90.69% of the total samples. The 51.16% of vehicles (22) are opened simply 
by retransmitting the key signal without any additional conditions. The 39.53% of all vehicles (17) have a 
“rolling code” technique coding system and are opened with the condition described above. The remaining 
vehicles have the particularity that the type of security system is PKES. The latter type of security system is 
more robust and cannot be unlocked through this attack. In this type of system, when the stored signal is 
replicated, the vehicle is locked during some time and the owner must carry out a procedure to unlock it; at this 
point, it is vulnerable to the theft of its belongings in the case of being approached by criminals. 
 
4.2 Brute-Force Attack 
The execution of this type of attack as described in section 3.2.2 is only possible for the 22 vehicles 
in Table 3, which support the replay attack without any conditions because they do not have an additional 
coding; however, as mentioned before, the execution of the attack is not viable from a temporary point of view. 
Based on this impediment, an analysis of the codes provided by each key fob was performed, considering the 
brand and model of each vehicle, to determine any possible relationship between them. The 22 vehicles were 
grouped into 4 brands which were named W, X, Y, and Z, corresponding to 4 of the most representative 
manufacturers in the market at a national level; the letters are used instead of the manufacturers’ own names. 
The analysis of the codes grouped by brand and model resulted in the matching of bits in certain positions 
within the 25 bits. For example, the three lightest bits of all manufacturers' keys match and have the value 
"010". These fixed values decrease the time TMA because the value of n in Equation 4 decreases to 21. The 
conventions that were used in the Tables for each brand to show the bit matches found are defined below. Table 
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4 sets out the convention for showing coincidence in the least significant bits of two or more codes within the 
same brand. Yellow, for example, indicates a match in bit 3, in addition to the three fixed bits mentioned above. 
So, if it is yellow with dashes, it indicates that the coincidence in bit 3 is matched at "1", and if it is yellow 
without dashes, it indicates that bit 3 is matched at "0". 
Table 4. Least significant bit conventions 
BRAND W, X, Y y   Z 
24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Description Matching Bit 
Position 
                         Bits (0-3), bit 3 is 0 
                         Bits (0-3), bit 3 is 1 
                         Bits (0-4), bit 4 is 0 
                         Bits (0-4) bit 4 is 1 
                         Bits (0-5), bit 5 is 0 
                         Bits (0-5), bit 5 is 1 
                         Bits (0- 6), bit 6 is 0 
                         Bits (0-6), bit 6 is 1 
                         Bits 0-7 
                         Bits 0-8 
Table 5 establishes the convention for showing coincidence in the most significant bits of two or more 
codes within the same brand. For the convention handled in the most significant bits, green represents 
coincidences of 2 or 3 bits, but it can vary with dashes, dots, or other for different matching combinations in 
the 3 bits. 
 
Table 5. Most significant bit conventions 
BRAND W, X, Y y   Z 
24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Description Matching Bit 
Position 
                
      
   Bits (22-24), bit 23 and 22 are 0 
                           Bits (22-24), bit 23 and 22 are 1 
                            Bits (22-24), bit 24 and 22 are 0 
                            Bits (22-24), bit 24 and 22 are 1 
                            Bits (22-24), bit 22 is 1 
                                                  Bits (21-24), bit 21 is 0 
                          Bits (21-24), bit 21 is1 
                                                  Bits 24-20 
                                                  Bits 24-19 
                                                  Bits 24-18 
 
Figures 15 and 16 show an example of the colour convention for the 2000 and 2008 models of brand 
Y, in the least significant bits, and the 2010 and 2017 models of brand X, in the most significant bits. 
 
 
Figure 15. Colour assignment identification according to the coincides in the LSB (Least Significant Bit) 
 
 
Figure 16. Colour assignment identification according to MSB matches (Most Significant Bit) 
 
Tables 6 to 9 show different matches that have been grouped for each of the 4 brands. The tables show 
the model of the vehicle and the security system unlocking key. In Tables 6, 8, and 9, 7 columns coincide in 
different positions per brand. The columns that coincide are enclosed with a red border, regardless of their 
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filling colour, as shown in Figure 17. If the 7 fixed bits for these brands are considered, 𝑛 decreases to 18 in 




Figure 17. Example of time reduction 𝑇𝑀𝐴 by fixed value in 7 columns 
 
 
In Table 6, additionally to the coincidences per column, there is a coincidence in the least significant 
bits depending on the model of the vehicle. In the vehicles of models 2011 and 2012, there is a match in the 7 
least significant bits; therefore, if we add the match in the bits from 13 to 15, we have a total of 10 matching 
bits. It decreases 𝑇𝑀𝐴 to 0.199 days (4.78 hours). The same happens with the vehicles of models 2014 and 
2015, with a variation in the value of bits 3, 5, and 6. In addition to this, there is also a match in the 3 most 
significant bits, having a total of 13 matching bits in those years. For the latter case, 𝑇𝑀𝐴 would go down to 
0.024 days (0.5977 hours). For the vehicle of model 2019, the maximum coincidence is 8 bits. 
 
Table 6. Brand W Unlocking Keys 
BRAND W 
Coincidences 
(Bit 20 - 24) 
Bit N° / 
Model 
24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Coincidences 
(Bit 0 - 7) 
••• 2011 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 •••• 
 2012 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 •••• 
• 2014 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 •••• 
••• 2015 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 •••• 
 2019 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 • 
 
Table 7 is the one with most coincidences per column, with a total of 9. With 9 fixed bits, the time 
𝑇𝑀𝐴  is reduced to 0.3984 days (9.563 hours). Besides, additional coincidences can be made in bit 6 and bits 
20, 22, and 23, depending on the model of the vehicle. 
 
 
Table 7. Brand X Unlocking Keys 
BRAND X 
Coincidences 
(Bit 19 - 24) 






22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Coincidences  
(Bit 0 - 7) 
••• 2010 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 • 
• 2012 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 • 
• 2015 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 •• 
••• 2017 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 •• 
•• 2018 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 • 
 
In Table 8, apart from the coincidences in the columns, other coincidences can be found in bits 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 22, 23, and 24, depending on the model. However, in this Table, there is a 2008 vehicle that is out of 
the matching patterns.  
 
Table 8. Brand Y Unlocking Keys 
BRAND Y 
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Coincidences 




24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Coincidences 
(Bit 0 - 8) 
•• 2000 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 ••••• 
 2008 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 ••••• 
•• 2008 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0  
 2008 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 •• 
•• 2009 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 •••• 
•• 2010 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 •••• 
• 2011 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 ••• 
 
Table 9 is the one with the fewest number of coincidences. Nonetheless, it maintains 7 columns with 
fixed values. 
 
Table 9. Brand Z Unlocking Keys 
BRAND Z 
Coincidences 
(Bit 21- 22) 
Bit N° / 
Model 
24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Coincidences 
(Bit 0 - 6) 
 2011 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 ••• 
 2015 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0  
 2016 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 •• 
• 2016 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 • 
• 2018 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 ••• 
 
Table 10 shows the decrease of the maximum execution time from the brute-force attack TMA due to 
fixed or matching values within the keys. Brands W, Y, and Z have at least 7 coincidences, and the brand X 
has at least 9. These coincidences may increase depending on the model of the vehicle; therefore, it can be up 



















2 223 51 – 1224.17  
    
3  222 25.5 – 612.08 
    
4  221 12.75 – 306.04 
    
5 220 6.37 – 153.02 
    
6 219 3.18 – 76.51 
    
7 218 1.59 – 38.25 ● 
 ● ● 
8 217 0.79 – 19.12  
   
9 216 0.39 – 9.56  ●   
10 215 0.19 – 4.78     
11 214 0.09 – 2.39     
12 213 0.04 -1.19     
13 212 0.02 – 0.59     
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
From this research project, it is concluded that the security systems implemented in a large part of the 
vehicles in Bogotá are susceptible to successful attacks using the proposed methods. It is evidenced that 
vehicles sold in recent years have vulnerable security systems and, in many cases, with weak technologies. 
This may come as a result of the final cost of the vehicle, which is affected by the implementation of a more 
modern security system, apart from other accessories; this fact may influence purchase decisions. Table 3 
shows that even vehicles sold in recent years -such as 2018 or 2019- have the most vulnerable security systems 
(although there are exceptions). This situation could be more alarming if we consider that the useful life of a 
vehicle in Colombia can be longer than 20 years, unlike other countries, where a vehicle fleet is more frequently 
renewed. The latter implies that the vehicle may be vulnerable to theft of belongings left inside it when it is no 
longer attractive to be completely stolen. On the other hand, it is concluded that, from the analysis, the brand 
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and model of the most vulnerable RKE systems allow to carry out brute-force attacks in just few hours, only 
in case there is no possibility to carry out a replay attack first. Furthermore, such attack can be used in a place 
with a high density of vehicles and when executed, one or more vehicles can be opened. It is worth mentioning 
that in Bogotá, the model of a vehicle can be deduced from its license plate. 
Regarding replay attacks, it can be concluded that they are not 100% effective, because, in the 
analysed sample, 4 vehicles have PKES systems that do not allow this type of attack. However, in the reviewed 
literature, vulnerabilities in relation to other types of attacks are evident. To execute a replay attack in its basic 
form, it is necessary for the user to press the unblocking button, so the signal can be stored and later 
retransmitted. Concerning the latter, an important conclusion is that the unlocking code can be generated from 
the locking one. In the tests performed on the 22 vehicles to which replay attacks could be applied 
unconditionally, it became clear that the locking code only differs from the unlocking one in the last three bits. 
Therefore, by using the signal generation method discussed in section 3.2.2, it is possible to generate the 
unlocking signal from the locking one. On the other hand, for the replay attack, there are 17 vehicles that use 
the "rolling code" technique and have the condition that the signal must be stored away from the vehicle 
coverage and will work only once. In theory, this would not represent a vulnerability if the owner of the vehicle 
always carries the keys; however, there can be several situations in which the owner can be separated from 
them. For example, in many car parks in Bogotá, it is required to leave the car keys there to park more vehicles 
in available spaces. Also, many others have valet parking service, just to mention some cases. 
Although replay and brute-force attacks are widely known, SDR platforms are used to implement 
them in this article. Additionally, a reverse engineering method on RKE systems with fixed code technology 
is presented. On the other hand, a discussion regarding more vulnerabilities in vehicles depending on the 
research location is promoted. 
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